The problem with ‘Islamism’, the Political Islam

A valuable contribution to recent critical analyses of Islamism as it is not limited to its ideology. Taking human rights and Islamic law as the context of the Islamist discourse, it has been able to observe the significant tension between idealism and activism. Activism pushed the Muslim Brotherhood to come into conflict with the Al Azhar Ulema who had been at the forefront in Tahrir Square, not to challenge but to replace its authority. The author concludes that this activism is among the factors that have obstructed Islamic law reform and the expansion of human rights. Reading this book I was reminded of similar tensions and compromises in Pakistan between Islamism and modernism on the one hand and with orthodoxy on the other.

Exploring: "Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam" (by Dr.M.Iqbal)

Islamism, especially the ideology as formulated by the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) in South Asia and the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world and that called for an Islamic state, has been attracting critical attention from scholars. The JI in Pakistan and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt both began political life as critics of the traditional approach to politics, stressing upon the sovereignty of God and enforcement of Sharia. In practical politics, they gradually adopted the concepts of the nation-state and democracy where they differed with traditional Islamic thought, but with reference to Islamic law they not only incorporated traditional fiqh into the concept of Sharia, but also its sectarian interpretation. The tension between sectarian and national conceptions of law posed crucial challenges to the concept of democratic rule of law, but Islamists justified it because they defined democracy as majority rule, even if it meant tyranny of the majority.

Scholars such as Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Sharia) faulted Islamists for their rejection of the secular state and found it problematic for the future of Sharia in Muslim countries. For the same reasons, but interpreting them differently, Wael Hallaq (The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament) concluded that the Islamic state based on Sharia as law is an “impossible state.” Most other academic studies also found Islamism paradoxical in its approach to the modern state. Hallaq, however, missed some very important inner developments in Muslim societies.

Humeira Iqtidar (Secularising Islamists? Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamaat-ud-Dawa in Urban Pakistan) observed that despite their vehement opposition, Islamists have been, in fact, facilitating the secularisation of Muslim societies. She argued that Islamists placed religion in the public life and forced Muslims to engage critically with it. By focusing on the state, Islamist movements accelerated the process of secularisation further. Projects to Islamise laws and knowledge could not resolve the tensions between sectarian Islam and secularising societies and added to the frustration of religious politics. These frustrations led to not only local, but also international faith-based and sectarian violence. Calls for an Islamic state eventually turned into clashes between the sects.

The ideology is detrimental to the progress of Islamic law argues a new book
The Arab Spring in 2010 was commonly regarded as a revolt against tyrannical regimes in the Arab world. Contrary to general expectations, it was Islamism that gained prominence in this revolt. Islamist parties in the Arab world adopted slogans of democracy and liberty and emerged more powerful than the others. They took it as an opportunity for establishing an Islamic state, but failed as soon as they came into power. According to Bassam Tibi (The Sharia State: Arab Spring and Democratisation), Islamists hijacked the Arab Spring with their rhetorical commitments to democratisation in order to win elections. They failed because rather than reducing, they quickened the tension between Islamic law and human rights as they imposed their conception of limited religious freedom. Rached Ghannouchi, the leader of al-Nahda, had already moved to separation between religion and state (Public Liberties in the Islamic State). Al-Nahda, which came to power after the Arab Spring in Tunisia, opted for a secular interpretation of an Islamic state. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt failed to resolve that tension. Moataz El Fegiery explores the story of this failure in his book Islamic Law and Human Rights: The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

El Fegiery finds that Islamism retarded the progress of Islamic law and human rights. The Muslim Brotherhood came into political prominence during the post-Hosni Mubarak era, winning half of the seats in the 2011 elections. They formed a government with Mohamed Morsi as president in June 2012. The Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed unprecedented political freedom until 2013, but Morsi was dethroned by a popular uprising that ended with military dictatorship. Examining its thinking on the relationship between Islamic law and human rights in Egypt, El Fegiery finds that the Muslim Brotherhood failed because it justified democracy in terms of a tyranny of the majority.
El Fegiery explains that Islamism is based on two assumptions: first, that Islam mandates Muslims to establish an Islamic state in which Islamic law regulates all aspects of state and society and, second, that the normative content of Sharia must comply with the methods developed by mainstream traditional Muslim jurists. The Muslim Brotherhood legitimised human rights in the traditional framework of Islamic law; it benefitted in coming to power but failed in the cultural practice of human rights.

This book offers a thorough analysis of the conceptual and theoretical issues about religion and human rights in general and studies major issues such as the supremacy of Sharia, political pluralism, freedom of opinion, minority rights, conversion and apostasy, and family law. The book concludes that management of political diversity is not possible in the Islamist framework.

El Fegiery finds the Muslim Brotherhood’s approach to human rights too theoretical to proceed within the framework of traditional Islamic law. Human rights developed historically with the evolution of international law and treaties. They adjusted universality with cultural diversity. Islamism failed to adjust with the concept of human rights because Islamists believe that the nature of Islamic law is not compatible with the idea of the nation-state. In fact, Islamic political theory has been quite pragmatic since the first four caliphs and has been adapting to changes in the Muslim body politic. Islamic law has limited the boundaries of Sharia and the doctrine of Siyasa [political science] has given more privileges to the rulers than the Islamists allow.

The Egyptian constitution recognises Islam as the religion of the state. The Muslim Brotherhood believes that Islam does not separate religion from politics, rather Islam is state. To them, the only legitimate method of interpreting Islamic law is traditional. The problem is that state law is a modern project, but not all human rights are normative in Sharia. This tension became obvious in the changed political context in the post-Mubarak era. Islamist policies to dominate and impose limitations on public liberties created mistrust in society. Freedom of religion and expression in the modern state requires pluralism. The Egyptian constitution also allowed the establishment of political parties. A focus on the unity of the Ummah in classical Islamic political theory prohibited dissent and considered it fitna and sedition. Although Islamists were divided on this issue, the political discourse by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt generated hate and violence against liberals, the left, the secular, and NGOs. Questioning their sincerity and piety, the regime declared these groups heretic and ignorant. Equal rights for non-Muslims as citizens also remained questionable. The Muslim Brotherhood evoked conflict between Islam and the West to justify restrictions on freedom.

El Fegiery finds that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt had two different positions on religion and freedom of expression depending on whether they were in opposition or in power: while in opposition they operated as a pressure group that proclaimed freedom but restricted it on issues such as modesty for women and censorship of artists and intellectuals. In power, in 2012 the regime imposed further restrictions, persecuting writers and artists in blasphemy cases.

This created tension for the Muslim Brotherhood in practice. They adopted orthodox criteria and targeted those who challenged Sharia as state law, and used censure to restrict arts. Activism, informed by this unclear and ambivalent criterion, made Morsi’s regime intolerant towards intellectual pluralism and gender equality.

The book is a valuable contribution to recent critical analyses of Islamism as it is not limited to its ideology. Taking human rights and Islamic law as the context of the Islamist discourse, it has been able to observe the significant tension between idealism and activism. Activism pushed the Muslim Brotherhood to come into conflict with the Al Azhar Ulema who had been at the forefront in Tahrir Square, not to challenge but to replace its authority. The author concludes that this activism is among the factors that have obstructed Islamic law reform and the expansion of human rights. Reading this book I was reminded of similar tensions and compromises in Pakistan between Islamism and modernism on the one hand and with orthodoxy on the other, but that is beyond the scope of the present review.

NON-FICTION: The problem with ‘Islamism’
MUHAMMAD KHALID MASUD-
Islamic Law and Human Rights: The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt By Moataz El Fegiery Cambridge Scholars Publishing, UK ISBN: 978-1443894791 340pp.

The reviewer is a former chairman of the Council of Islamic Ideology

Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, February 26th, 2017
https://www.dawn.com/news/1316817/non-fiction-the-problem-with-islamism

Also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Modernism

1. Religion cause Wars?
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Islam And Modernism By: Mufti Taqi Usmani : Free Download ...

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Jul 2, 2011 - Islam And Modernism By: Mufti Taqi Usmani. Topics Islam, And, Modernism, By:, Mufti, Taqi, Usmani,. Mediatype texts. Identifier ...

Islam & modernism - Newspaper - DAWN.COM

www.dawn.com/news/1128387

Aug 29, 2014 - But the hateful beliefs of Muslims against non believers and concept of Jihad to kill non muslims goes back to about 1000 AD. Historically, that is the time when Islamic renaissance stopped and the religion took a turn against modernity and advancement to its present form.

Modernism in Islam - ilaam.net

www.ilaam.net/Opinions/Modernism.html

Modernism in Islam. by Jamaal al-Din Zarabozo. Based on "Modernism in Islam" lecture series by Sh. Zarabozo. WHAT IS MODERNISM AND WHERE DID IT ...

Islam and Modernism by Abdus Sattar Ghazali

ghazali.net/book4/

An online book by Abdus Sattar Ghazali; examines movements of regeneration and/or revival in the Muslim world from the 18th to the 20th centuries; includes an ...

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Folk Islam

Smokers’ Corner: Economics of spirituality by Nadeem F. Paracha, dawn.com

‘Folk Islam?’ Yes, Folk Islam — the strand of faith that still drives the everyday lives of millions of Pakistanis, especially in the country’s vast rural and semi-rural areas. And yet, till about 35 years ago, its social and cultural dynamics were intertwined with large segments of the country’s urban milieus as well.

Folk Islam, or the version that is present among Muslim populations in Pakistan and India, is that strand of the faith that emerged when — from the 12th century onwards — Muslim generals and monarchs from Central Asia, Iraq, Turkey and Afghanistan began to invade India.

While setting up their respective kingdoms in the region, they brought with them not only soldiers, ministers (wazirs) and clerics. With them and during their rule, also came a steady stream of Sufis.

The majority of their subjects in India were Hindus. But instead of trying to do the impossible by converting such a large population into accepting Islam, most of the Muslim rulers began to heed the advice of the Sufis who wanted to interact with the Hindu majority.

How economic well-being can affect centuries of faith and belief in just a few decades
This was an exhibition of political pragmatism on the part of the rulers who managed to ‘Indianise’ their presence through the cultural and theological interaction and intellectual exchange between the Sufis and the Hindus of India.

This interaction and exchange eventually began to evolve a rather unique brand of Islamic faith among the Muslims of India. Various non-Muslim traditions and ideas (that, to the Sufis, did not contradict the main beliefs of Islam) were adopted and as they evolved they weaved themselves into the social and economic fabric of everyday life of the Muslims of the region.

To put it briefly, on most occasions than not, following a more orthodox strand of Islam (by the Muslims) actually began to invite social isolation, and consequently, economic problems.

This was most apparent during the long reigns of three Mughal kings, Akbar, Jahangir and Shahjahan (16th-17th centuries), who were ardent followers of Sufi saints and adopted the strand of Islam that had been developing in the region.

This strand was never put down on paper and defined as a concrete philosophy as such. It was too tied to the daily ethos of the common Muslim folk of the land — a religious ethos that repulsed the more orthodox Muslims.

This indigenous strand of Islam that developed in the region between the 12th and 16th centuries helped the Muslim rulers of India to maintain a social contract of sorts between them and the region’s Hindu majority.

But more importantly it was the economic aspect in this regard that was also one of the main factors that helped this Folk Islam of the period to thrive and grow. It was supplementing the politics of the ruling elite; it worked well with the resultant social, economic and cultural dynamics of the period’s agrarian society and economy.

But all this began to change with the slow and painful decline of the Muslim empire in India from the 18th century onwards. As British colonialists began to strengthen their grip in the region and introduce political ideas derived from mercantilism, Muslim thinkers of the period became despondent because they had no idea how to face such a challenge, especially on political and economic levels.

As a consequence, after some 500 years of ruling India, these Muslim thinkers for the first time became conscious of the fact that they were a minority in India. In the 19th century a string of Muslim scholars and ideologues emerged. The moderate ones first tried to rekindle the pride and the past of their bygone empire and at the same time asked the Muslims to adjust their intellectual and economic dispositions according to the new ideas being introduced by the British colonialists.

Though such pleas attracted the small numbers of urban Muslims, the battle for the hearts and minds of the majority of Muslims in India was initially fought between two distinct groups of religionists. These would eventually evolve into becoming two new indigenous Sunni Muslim sub-sects in the region.

One group emerged from the Islamic seminaries of the Indian town of Deoband (and became known as Deobandis). Their analysis concluded that the Muslim empire in India collapsed because the rulers continued to distance themselves from the tenants of ‘true Islam’ and (thus) fell victim to the decadent and deviant spiritual concoctions.

Instead they advocated the undoing of what passed for Islam among the Indian Muslims and the infusion of more orthodox strands of the faith.

But the system of belief ingrained for 500 years in the ways of the Muslims of the region was just too deep to exorcise the way the Deobandis wanted to. As a reaction, some Islamic scholars appeared from the Indian town of Bareilly (hence called the ‘Barelvis’), who mounted a hefty polemical and doctrinal defense of the beliefs of the common Muslims of India.

Though the Muslims who had been urbanised and impacted by the colonial mercantile capitalism of the ‘British Raj’ became either ‘Muslim modernists’ or began to drift towards what the Deobandis were advocating, the majority of Muslims who were still tied to agriculture remained attached to Folk Islam because it now became attached to powerful landed Islamic spiritual leaders (the pirs).These pirs became essential elements behind the agrarian Muslims’ economic well being.

After the creation of Pakistan, so-called Barelvi Islam was allowed to prosper in Pakistan and some of its traits, like its spiritual music-forms (such as the Qawaali), colourful rituals (adopted and augmented from certain indigenous regional rituals) and traditions also became popular among the urban working-classes and segments of the middle-classes.

During the government of Z.A. Bhutto in the 1970s these became politicised when the government began to express its populist tenor by using the traditions of visiting Sufi shrines (to mingle with the masses) and adopting popular Sufi anthems as party songs at rallies.

Nevertheless, this strand of the faith gradually began to erode when the same government also opened up brand new avenues of employment for Pakistanis in the oil-rich Arab countries.

Here the Pakistanis came across a dryer and more puritanical strand of Islam and by the early 1980s, much of the country’s urban middle and lower-middle-classes had begun to shun their folk pasts.

This past, it was believed, was not suitable to sustain the kind of economic tendencies that more and more Pakistanis were now embroiled in, especially after earning in Riyals and Dirhams.

The nature of the new money that began to pour into Pakistan from the pockets of those who had worked in or were still working in oil-rich Arab countries was such that it came with an undeclared condition: This money will only benefit you if you mend your distorted religious beliefs.

Since society was becoming polarised into groups that would prefer to only interact with their own kind, pragmatism demanded that one (even superficially) adopt the faith of those with money to spend and invest.

When most Pakistanis came into contact with their Arab employers, they were initially disoriented by what they saw and felt was a somewhat dry strand of the faith.

Never before had the Pakistani working and middle-class folk (who managed to travel to countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the 1970s), made the kind of money that they began to make in those spiritually dry but materially rich lands of the limousine-driving Arabs.

However, more than these Pakistanis being persuaded to give up their old version of the faith and take up what their Arab paymasters insisted was ‘true Islam,’ it was the money that they made and the sudden rise in their social status back home, is what convinced them to shed their old beliefs.

After all, the old beliefs now reminded these Pakistanis of days that may have been more fun and open-ended, but these were also days when they had struggled to own their own TV set, freezer, air-conditioning unit and refrigerator.

In other words, the shedding of folk traditions and the adoption of a new strain of the faith also became a kind of a badge exhibiting a person’s enhanced economic status and social standing.

Nevertheless, in the last three decades, this is changing. But to what? For this one will have to find out what spiritual exhibition and disposition is now guaranteeing economic well-being.

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, June 7th, 2015

What is meant by KHALIFA in Quran?

Generally the word 'Khalifa' in Sura 2.30 is taken to mean that Man is the 'representative' . 

وَإِذْ قَالَ رَبُّكَ لِلْمَلَائِكَةِ إِنِّي جَاعِلٌ فِي الْأَرْضِ خَلِيفَةً ۖ قَالُوا أَتَجْعَلُ فِيهَا مَن يُفْسِدُ فِيهَا وَيَسْفِكُ الدِّمَاءَ وَنَحْنُ نُسَبِّحُ بِحَمْدِكَ وَنُقَدِّسُ لَكَ ۖ قَالَ إِنِّي أَعْلَمُ مَا لَا تَعْلَمُونَ 

And [mention, O Muhammad], when your Lord said to the angels, "Indeed, I will make upon the earth a successive authority." They said, "Will You place upon it one who causes corruption therein and sheds blood, while we declare Your praise and sanctify You?" Allah said, "Indeed, I know that which you do not know." (Quran;2:30)

Let us explain the significance and importance :

It is vicious to spread the false concept that God's sovereignty can be delegated. This concept took its origin among the Christians and gave birth to theocracy. The Christian kings modified the concept to give it the form of "Divine rights of the kings."

The same idea came into vogue among the Muslims after caliphate changed into kingship and Muslim kings began to call themselves 'shadow of God on the earth'. From then onwards, Muslim kings became sovereign in the worldly affairs and Muslim priests in the religious affairs; and the 'Islam' became split up into 'church and state'.

The concept of delegation of sovereignty of God to man is absolutely false from the Quranic point of view.

Delegation of power from one person to another means that the latter gains absolute control of power for a certain period and that the exercise of this power by the former becomes suspended in the meantime.

Secondly, the occasion for the delegation of power by a certain authority arises when that authority itself is not present at the place where the power is to be exercised. But God is Omnipresent.

The question of His being not in control, at any time or anywhere, does not arise. God does not delegate his sovereignty to anyone, not even to His messengers, who themselves are subservient to His laws.

Now let us see the argument produced in support of this false concept of delegation of Allah's sovereignty. They consider man as 'khalifatullah' and erroneously translate it as 'vicegerent of God' which means that he exercises delegated powers of God.

As a matter of fact, there is not a single instance in the holy Quran where man is described as 'khalifatullah' successor of God. He is rather described a 'khalifat al-ard' When God addressed the angels and said: 

"l will create a Khalifa' on the earth" (2:30)

It pointed towards the creation of a successor to the preceding prehuman generations that lived on the earth before mankind.

Moreover, in order to clarify the point that man is not a representative, successor of God, we shall have to clarify the meaning of the word 'Khalifa'. There are three basic concepts in the meaning of the words with the root ' K', ' L', ' F'.

(a) To succeed, 

(b) To follow 

(c) To undergo change.

The holy Quran is self-explanatory. It says: "And it is He Who made the night and day to follow each 

other. " (25.62)

Again it is said: 

إِنَّ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَاخْتِلَافِ اللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ وَالْفُلْكِ 

"Day and night coming one after the other. " (2:164)

'B' can become the Khalifa of 'A' only in his absence. 'A' may be dead or alive but 'B' cannot take his place as Khalifa in his presence. The following verses of the Quran support it:

Before Moses went up on the mount for communion with His Lord, he said to his brother Haroon: 

 وَوَاعَدْنَا مُوسَىٰ ثَلَاثِينَ لَيْلَةً وَأَتْمَمْنَاهَا بِعَشْرٍ فَتَمَّ مِيقَاتُ رَبِّهِ أَرْبَعِينَ لَيْلَةً ۚ وَقَالَ مُوسَىٰ لِأَخِيهِ هَارُونَ اخْلُفْنِي فِي قَوْمِي وَأَصْلِحْ وَلَا تَتَّبِعْ سَبِيلَ الْمُفْسِدِينَ

"You shall succeed me amongst my people (in my absence) " (7:142)

At yet another place it is said: 

ثُمَّ جَعَلْنَاكُمْ خَلَائِفَ فِي الْأَرْضِ مِن بَعْدِهِمْ لِنَنظُرَ كَيْفَ تَعْمَلُونَ

"Then We made you successors in the land after them, to see how you would behave. " (10:14)

Hud said to his people: 

فَإِن تَوَلَّوْا فَقَدْ أَبْلَغْتُكُم مَّا أُرْسِلْتُ بِهِ إِلَيْكُمْ ۚ وَيَسْتَخْلِفُ رَبِّي قَوْمًا غَيْرَكُمْ وَلَا تَضُرُّونَهُ شَيْئًا ۚ إِنَّ رَبِّي عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ حَفِيظٌ

"(lf you turn away from the divine guidance), my Lord will make another people to succeed you. " (11:57)

About the people of Aad it is said: 

 أَوَعَجِبْتُمْ أَن جَاءَكُمْ ذِكْرٌ مِّن رَّبِّكُمْ عَلَىٰ رَجُلٍ مِّنكُمْ لِيُنذِرَكُمْ ۚ وَاذْكُرُوا إِذْ جَعَلَكُمْ خُلَفَاءَ مِن بَعْدِ قَوْمِ نُوحٍ وَزَادَكُمْ فِي الْخَلْقِ بَسْطَةً ۖ فَاذْكُرُوا آلَاءَ اللَّـهِ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُفْلِحُونَ

"ln that He made you successors after the people of Noah. " (7.69)

The holy Quran has, thus amply clarified that a Khalifa is a successor in the absence or on the death of his predecessor. Hence the question of somebody being a 'representative' does not arise.

The concept of 'representative' is the invention of self-interested individuals who wanted to exploit people in the garb of 'God's vicegerency.'

God is the lawmaker. The word 'khalifat fil-ard' simply means to hold reins of power with the purpose of putting into application the divine laws in human affairs. God's laws are immutable and cannot be changed.

لَيْسَ لَكَ مِنَ الْأَمْرِ شَيْءٌ أَوْ يَتُوبَ عَلَيْهِمْ أَوْ يُعَذِّبَهُمْ فَإِنَّهُمْ ظَالِمُونَ

"No body can change the laws of Allah. " (6:34)

Not even messenger of God: 

وَلَقَدْ كُذِّبَتْ رُسُلٌ مِّن قَبْلِكَ فَصَبَرُوا عَلَىٰ مَا كُذِّبُوا وَأُوذُوا حَتَّىٰ أَتَاهُمْ نَصْرُنَا ۚ وَلَا مُبَدِّلَ لِكَلِمَاتِ اللَّـهِ ۚ وَلَقَدْ جَاءَكَ مِن نَّبَإِ الْمُرْسَلِينَ

"(O Messenger of God!) You are not given the authority to change the laws of God. " (3.128)

God is the only Sovereign. There is no sovereign except God. He is the only authority to whose laws subservience of man is due.

The believers are an instrument to enforce the divine laws and its jurisdiction in law making and are confined within specific limits; it does not hold absolute rights of law making.

The law making in Quranic society is a blend of Permanence and Change. The fundamental principles given by the Quran are Permanent and Immutable.

http://www.islamicweb.com/beliefs/cults/submit_satan.htm

More: http://pakistan-posts.blogspot.com/2013/04/shariah-or-democracy-conflict-or.html